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ABSTRACT
Two recent holdings from the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit in Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp. have
come under fire from members of the patent community. In Promega,
the Federal Circuit held that i) 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) does not
require a third party to "actively induce the combination" of a
patented invention, and ii) that a single component can be a
"substantial portion" of the components of patented invention. In
this Article, I argue that the Federal Circuit decided these issues
correctly in light of the policy considerations that went into
Congress's enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) following the Supreme
Court's unpopular Deepsouth decision. I further argue that there is
no requirement of knowledge of a patent to find inducement under §
271(f)(1), only knowledge of the infringing acts. Overturning these
holdings would, in effect, have ushered in a return to the world
immediately after the Deepsouth decision, before the
implementation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f).
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INTRODUCTION
In 1972, the Supreme Court held Deepsouth Packing
Company's building and exporting unassembled parts of a machine
to be permissible, in spite of the fact that such actions would infringe
upon the patents of Laitram Corporation Corp. had those parts been
assembled in the United States.1 Concerning Deepsouth's activities
1

Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972).

2017]

DEEPSOUTH WILL RISE AGAIN

161

in the U.S., the Court wrote, "[w]e cannot endorse the view that the
'substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of (a) machine'
constitutes direct infringement when we have so often held that a
combination patent protects only against the operable assembly of
the whole and not the manufacture of its parts."2 Because the Court
found no direct infringement, it could not find contributory
infringement.3 Criticism of the Deepsouth decision4 ultimately
motivated Congress to amend 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) by adding sections
(f)(1) and (f)(2).5
In 2014, the Federal Circuit interpreted those sections,
sparking criticism from the patent bar.6 Specifically, Promega
Corporation v. Life Technologies Corporation7 held that 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(f)(1) does not require a third party for one "to actively induce
the combination" of a patented device,8 and that a single component
of an invention can be a "substantial portion of the components."9
Notable among the decision's critics, Professor Jason Rantanen has
argued that this holding are "probably erroneous—doctrinal
developments",10 that the majority's first holding is an incorrect
textual analysis,11 and that the second holding makes 35 U.S.C. §
2

Id. at 528 (paraphrasing Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 443 F.2d
936, 939 (5th Cir. 1971)).
3
Id. at 526 ("[I]t is established that there can be no contributory infringement
without the fact or intention of a direct infringement.").
4
See, e.g., Neil M. Zipkin, Infringement and Assembly Abroad—Patent
Protection Takes a Vacation in Deepsouth, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 662, 663–64,
691 (1973).
5
See 98 Cong. Rec. H28069 (daily ed. October 1, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier intend to amend 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)); Patent Law Amendments Act
of 1984, Pub. Law No. 98-622, § 101, 98 Stat. 3383, 3383 (1984) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)–(2) (2012).
6
Jason Rantanen, Promega v. Life Tech, pt. 2: Inducing Oneself, PATENTLY-O
(Jan. 8, 2015), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/01/promega
-inducement-ones.html.
7
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1350–57 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
8
Id. at 1351.
9
Id. at 1356.
10
Rantanen, supra note 7.
11
Id.
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271(f)(2) superfluous.12
Proceeding in five parts, this Article examines this conflict
in detail and supports the Federal Circuit's holding on these issues.
Part II of the Article provides a technical background for the patents
in suit in Promega. Part III of the Article addresses the details of the
case: subsections III.A, III.B, and III.C respectively discuss the
patents-in-suit, the accused products, and the majority opinion,
paying particular attention to the two holdings relating to selfinducement to infringe a patent and the meaning of "a substantial
portion of the components." Part IV.A examines the concept of a
continuum of acts required for indirect patent infringement from
inducement to contributory infringement, with specific attention to
the substantiality and scienter requirements for such acts.13 Part
IV.B discusses the controversy over what constitutes a substantial
portion of the components with respect to § 271(f)(1), and proposes
an interpretation of the statute to resolve the issues raised in
Promega. Part IV.C investigates the question of whether the
Promega decision requires a third party who actually commits the
infringement in order to find inducement. Part IV.D looks into the
legislative history of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) with regard to knowledge
of the patent being infringed, and ultimately argues that the statute
requires only knowledge of the act that infringes, not knowledge of
the patent, for inducement liability to attach.
I.

BACKGROUND

The method of identifying patterns in DNA, called shorttandem repeat ("STR") profiling, has become an important tool in
forensic analysis of crime scenes and paternity testing.14 In order to
obtain a large enough DNA sample, a technician must first make
multiple copies of the DNA in a process called amplification; this is
commonly achieved through a technique called polymerase chain
12

Rantanen, supra note 7.
See infra Part IV.
14
The Biology Project, What is a Short Tandem Repeat Polymorphism (STR)?,
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA,
http://www.biology.arizona.edu/human_bio/activities/blackett2/str_description.h
tml (last visited April 2, 2016) [hereinafter Polymorphism].
13
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reaction ("PCR").15 Polymerase is an enzyme that copies strands of
DNA.16 In order for polymerase to do its work, technicians use a
primer or marker molecule to target the start and end, or locus, of
the STR of interest.17 Traditionally, a technician replicates one STR
at a time. This process can be time-consuming.18 The patents and
accused infringing products in the case of Promega Corp. v. Life
Technologies Corp. encompass methods for amplifying multiple
STRs simultaneously, greatly increasing the speed of the process.19
II.

PROMEGA CORP. V. LIFE TECHNOLOGIES (FED. CIR. 2014)

A. Basis of the Controversy
Promega owns four patents claiming methods for multiplex
STR loci amplification.20 Promega is also the exclusive licensee of
a fifth patent from the Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Forderung der
Wissenschaften (The Max Planck Society), known as the Tautz
patent.21
The Tautz patent claims a kit for analyzing polymorphism in
a DNA sample.22 This kit contains a) a mixture of primers; b) a
polymerase; c) the G, C, T, and A nucleotides; d) a buffer solution;
and e) template DNA.23
Life Technologies Corporation ("LifeTech") makes kits that
include all of the limitations claimed by the Tautz patent.24 The kits
15

Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1341 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
16
Id.
17
Id. at 1341–42.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
U.S. Patent No. 7,008,771 (filed Sep. 6, 2002) [hereinafter '771 Patent]; U.S.
Patent No. 6,221,598 (filed Jun. 7, 1999) [hereinafter '589 Patent]; U.S. Patent
No. 6,479,235 (filed Nov. 25, 1998) [hereinafter '235 Patent]; U.S. Patent No.
5,843,660 (filed Apr. 15, 1996) [hereinafter '660 Patent].
21
U.S. Patent No. RE37, 984 (filed Jun. 9, 2000) [hereinafter Tautz Patent].
22
Tautz Patent, supra, col. 16, l. 43–61.
23
Id.
24
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1344 (Fed. Cir.
2014); see also id. at 1350.
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are used for multiplexing DNA samples, including but not limited
to the STR combinations claimed by Promega's patents.25 LifeTech
manufactures the polymerase component of the kit in the United
States, and ships it overseas to a subsidiary facility in the United
Kingdom, where workers assemble the polymerase with the
remaining items to form the complete kits for worldwide
distribution.26 In 2006, a predecessor company to LifeTech obtained
a limited cross-license to the alleged inventions in the four Promega
patents and the Tautz patent for "Forensics and Human Identity
Applications."27
B. Procedural History
Promega filed suit against LifeTech in 2010 for direct and
induced infringement, alleging sales of the accused kits in
applications beyond those subject to the limited 2006 license.28 The
District Court judge instructed the jury to evaluate induced
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), including sales of "all kits
made, used, offered for sale, sold within the United States or
imported into the United States, as well as kits made outside the
United States where a substantial portion of the components [were]
supplied from the United States."29 LifeTech objected to the
inclusion of the § 271(f)(1) instruction, arguing that because its own
subsidiary owned the U.K. facility completing the final assembly of
the accused kits, inducement was inapplicable: a company cannot
induce itself to infringe a patent under § 271(f)(1).30
The jury attributed all of LifeTech's worldwide sales to
infringing acts in the United States, and awarded $52 million in lost
profits to Promega.31 LifeTech moved for judgment as a matter of
law ("JMOL") on damages for infringement.32 The judge granted
25

Id. at 1344.
Id.
27
Id. at 1356 (quoting the confidential licensing agreement).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1345 (emphasis added).
30
Id. at 1344.
31
Id. at 1350.
32
Id. at 1341.
26
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LifeTech's motion and denied Promega's motion to reconsider.33
Both parties appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.34
C. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Chen decided that "to
actively induce the combination" of an infringing device under 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) does not require a third party,35 and that "there
are circumstances in which a party may be liable under § 271(f)(1)
for supplying . . . a single component for combination outside the
United States."36 The "single component" analysis interpreted the
plain meaning of the words "substantial" and "portion."37 The court
held that these words connoted importance and essentiality.38
LifeTech's counsel argued that Congress explicitly chose the use of
the plural "components" in (1), and the use of "component" in (f)(2),
and that therefore, (f)(1) required "components" plural for
inducement.39 The court rejected this argument, noting that they
were used in different contexts.40 The court also highlighted
subsection (f)(2)'s focus on inducement regarding any component
"especially made for use in [a patented] invention . . . not a staple
article or commodity suitable for substantial non-infringing uses."41
Among the six findings of the Federal Circuit panel, these two have
garnered the most attention of commentators in the world of patent
law.42 Members of the patent bar community have argued that these
holdings are erroneous and likely to be overturned by the Supreme

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id. at 1351.
36
Id. at 1353.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 1354.
40
Id.
41
Id. (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)–(2) (2010)).
42
Id. at 1351; see also Rantanen, supra note 7.
34
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Court.43
1. Self-inducement Under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1)
Relying on a strict interpretation of the statutory language,
the Federal Circuit found that the object of the inducement is not
necessarily a third party. Rather, it is the combination of infringing
components that the word "inducement" applies.44 While the court
acknowledged that the word 'induce' can mean 'to influence another
person,' it took a broad view of the meaning of the word, citing the
Oxford English Dictionary, "'[t]o bring about, bring on, produce,
cause, give rise to.'"45 Further, the court noted that, in drafting §
271(f)(1), Congress could have included the word another to
indicate that inducement required a separate party, but ultimately did
not.46
Because there is a lack of clear precedent on these matters,
the court went on to examine the legislative history of § 271(f), and
found that "[i]n order to be liable as an infringer under paragraph
(f)(1), one must supply or cause to be supplied 'all or a substantial
portion' of the components in a manner that would infringe the
patent if such combination occurred within the United States."47 In
particular, the legislative history states Congress's policy goal in
enacting section § 271(f)(1) was to "prevent copiers from avoiding
United States patents by supplying components of a patented
product in this Country so that the assembly of the components may
be completed abroad."48 The court noted, "it is unlikely that
Congress intended § 271(f)(1) to hold companies liable for shipping
components overseas to third parties, but not for shipping those
same components overseas to themselves or their foreign

43

Rantanen, supra note 7.
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
45
Id. (citing VII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 888 (2d ed. 1989)).
46
Id.
47
Id. (citing Section-by-Section Analysis: Patent Law Amendments of 1984,
130 Cong. Rec. 28,069 (1984) as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5827, 5828)
[hereinafter, Legislative History].
48
Legislative History, supra note 50, at 5828.
44
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subsidiaries."49
While LifeTech relied upon Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v.
SEB S.A. to argue that inducement requires a third party, the
court distinguished SEB by noting that the case implied the
presence of inducement of another party, because under SEB's
facts, there actually was another party. Taken together, § 271(a)
and (b) naturally presume a direct infringer, and one who
induces that party to infringe.49 However, the court found
analogies to § 271(b) to be of limited value because § 271(f)(1)
lacks a companion statute regarding strict liability infringement
like that of § 271(a).50 Accordingly, the court held that one need
not induce another in order to be liable under § 271(f)(1).51
2. "Substantial Portion of the Components"
Congress also took issue with the Federal Circuit's finding
that "there are circumstances in which a party may be liable under §
271(f)(1) for supplying or causing to be supplied a single component
for combination outside the United States."52 Here, again, the court
relied upon dictionaries for the plain meaning of "substantial,"
finding that it equates to "'essential.'"53 In defining "portion" as "a
part of a whole," the court found no support for the assertion that a
portion need include a "certain quantity" of an invention.54 In other
words, one component can be sufficiently "substantial" to satisfy §
271(f)(1).
LifeTech argued that the inclusion "substantial" within the
statutory language "substantial portion of the components," suggests
that a defendant can be liable under § 271(f)(1) only when they
supply more than one component.55 The court rejected this
49

Promega, 773 F.3d at 1353.
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 1353 (emphasis added).
53
Id. (citing XVII OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 67 (2d ed.1989)).
54
Id. (citing AM. HERITAGE COLL. DICTIONARY 1066 (4th ed. 2000)).
55
Id. at 1354.
49
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interpretation, holding that 271(f)(1) applies to "a substantial portion
of the components," not merely "the components" of a patented
invention.56 In short, the action of the subject of the statutory
language (the inducer), acts on the singular noun "portion," not the
plural noun "components."57
Next, LifeTech relied on Microsoft v. AT&T Corp,58
highlighting two footnotes where the Supreme Court noted that §
271(f)(1) and (2) differ in the number of components that one must
supply to be liable.59 Yet the Promega court noted that LifeTech
ignored the next lines where the Supreme Court discussed §
271(f)(1) in the context of a single component.60 LifeTech then
argued that, because the Supreme Court discussed § 271(f)(2) in the
context of a single component, the court had implied that § 271(f)(2)
applied only to combinations of more than one component.61 The
Federal Circuit found this argument unpersuasive.62
Applying this understanding to Promega, the Federal Circuit
found that the polymerase component of the accused kit was a
substantial portion of the components of the invention because the
kit was useless without it.63 The court relied upon LifeTech's own
testimony that the polymerase was "one of the 'main' and 'major'

56

Id.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).
58
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
59
Id. at 1355. While the two paragraphs differ, among other things, on the quantity
of components that must be "supplie[d] ... from the United States" for liability to
attach, see infra, at 1760, n. 18, that distinction does not affect our analysis.
Paragraph (2), like (1), covers only a "component" amenable to "combination."
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part, in such
manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the
United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer. 35 U.S.C. §
271(f)(1); see also Microsoft v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1356.
62
Id. at 1358.
63
Id.
57
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components of the accused kits."64 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
found that, without the polymerase component, the testing kit
"would be inoperable because no PCR would occur."65 The Federal
Circuit overturned the district court's grant of LifeTech's motion for
JMOL, siding with the jury finding that LifeTech was liable for
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).66
This decision left the post-Promega world with an
inadequate understanding of what constituted a substantial portion
of the components of an invention. Short of an accused infringer's
admission, the Federal Circuit provided no factors or guidance to
determine what constitutes a 'substantial portion,' whether it is
merely something required to make the invention work, or
something more.67 For instance, it is likely that the kit would not
operate without the buffer solution, which is presumably a
commodity. Yet the court did not address whether a commodity
component required for the invention to function, or a component
with no non-infringing uses could count as a substantial portion
under § 271(f)(1).
III.

DISCUSSION

A. Statutory Landscape and the Indirect Infringement Continuum
To support the Federal Circuit's finding that a single
component can represent a substantial portion of the components of
an invention, it is necessary to examine the different types of indirect
infringement covered by the various sections of 35 U.S.C. § 271.
Four separate subsections of 35 U.S.C. § 271 codify the law of
indirect infringement—specifically subsections (b), (c), (f)(1), and
(f)(2).68 These subsections represent a continuum of acts required to
64

Id.
Id. at 1358.
66
Id. at 1357.
67
Id. at 1356.
68
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010). Subsection (c) discusses contributory infringement,
which is itself a subset of the concept of inducement.
65
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find indirect infringement with inducement represented by § 271(b)
at one end, and contributory infringement represented by § (f)(2)
and (c) at the other. Section 271(b) involves the act of inducing
someone (arguably even oneself) to infringe a patent, and has three
requirements—knowledge of the patent at issue, the intent to
infringe, and an underlying act of direct infringement—in order for
liability to attach.69
By contrast, contributory infringement deals with the act of
supplying components that are then combined to infringe a patent.70
The statute explicitly requires that the supplier must know the
components will be combined in an infringing manner to find
contributory infringement.71 The applicability of each subsection
depends on what the accused infringers, knew, intended, and
actually did to bring about the controversy by both direct and
indirect means.
Despite the Supreme Court's decision, Section 271(f)(1)
continues to occupy the murky middle ground at issue in Promega.
However, the differences between (f)(1), (f)(2), and 271(c), coupled
with the provision's legislative history, may speak to Congress's
intent in considering what counts as a "substantial portion" of the
components and whether inducement requires a third party. The
legislative history also suggests that the Supreme Court ruling in
SEB regarding § 271(b)'s knowledge of infringement requirement
was never intended to apply to §271(f)(1).
1. The Continuum of Acts Required to Find Indirect Infringement:
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) to § 271(f)(2)
At one end of the continuum lies § 271(b). U.S. patent
holders seeking to enforce their patents in foreign countries often
rely on the inducement theory in § 271(b) because it has exceptions
to extraterritorial limitations and thus may extend the reach of U.S.
patent law to foreign countries.72 The section's scant text contains
69

Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 763 (2011); 35
U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010).
70
35 U.S.C. § 271(c); 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
71
35 U.S.C. § 271.
72
See e.g., Global-Tech Appliances, 563 U.S. at 754.
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no requirement that shipment of components, substantial or
otherwise, be involved in order to induce. Providing instructions to
a party to use an item in an infringing manner may be sufficient for
liability to attach under § 271(b).73 However, the subsection has one
key limitation. Unlike direct infringement, which is a strict liability
offense,74 inducement requires both knowledge—or, more rarely,
willful blindness—of a patent and the intent to infringe upon it.75
At the opposite end of the continuum are § 271(c) and (f)(2).
These subsections deal with contributory or contribution-like
infringement, and its elements are decomposed in Table 1 below.
Table 1. Comparison of the elements of 35 U.S.C. §271(c), (f)(1), & (f)(2).
271(c)76
271(f)(1)77
271(f)(2)78
Whoever offers to sell or Whoever without
Whoever without authority
sells or imports
authority supplies
supplies or causes to be
or causes to be
supplied
supplied
into the United States
in or from the
in or from the United
United States
States
a component of a
all or a substantial
any component of a
patented machine . . . or
portion of the
patented invention
a[n] apparatus for use in
components of a
. . . a patented process
patented invention
constituting a material
part of the invention

that is especially made or
especially adapted for use
in the invention

knowing the same to be
especially made or
especially adapted for
use in an infringement of
such patent
not a staple article or
commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial
noninfringing use

knowing that such
component is so made or
adapted

73

not a staple article or
commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial
noninfringing use

Id. at 759.
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (20152012).
75
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
76
35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
77
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).
78
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(2).
74
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shall be liable as a
contributory infringer

where such
components are
uncombined in
whole or in part
. . .to actively
induce the
combination of
such components
outside of the
United States in a
manner that would
infringe the patent
if such
combination
occurred within the
United States
shall be liable as an
infringer.

[VOL. 12:2

where such component is
uncombined in whole or in
part
intending that such
component will be
combined outside of the
United States in a manner
that would infringe the
patent if such combination
occurred within the United
States

shall be liable as an
infringer

This decomposition highlights many similarities between
subsections (f)(2) and (c), but also a few key differences. In
particular, the phrase in subsection (c) discussing the kind of part—
a material part of the invention in subsection (c)—corresponds to
the phrase especially made in (f)(2). This language provides some
evidence of Congressional intent for purposes of interpreting
"substantial portion of the components" under subsection (f)(1),
whose statutory language and legislative history are otherwise silent
as to what constitutes substantial. Further, § 271(c) deals solely with
acts in the U.S. Congress directed the intent clause of subsection
(f)(2) towards intent to combine components overseas, and the
supply clause ties that intent to combine back to the shores of the
U.S., which puts it within the purview of 271(b).
B. What is a Substantial Portion of the Components?
The majority in Promega held that a single component of a
patented invention could constitute a "substantial portion of the
components" under § 271(f)(1).79 Professor Rantanen, however, has
79

Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
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taken issue with the majority's holding80 and cautions that this could
greatly expand liability under the provision.81 Specifically, he
argues "[the] 'especially made or especially adapted for use in the
invention and not a staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial noninfringing use'" provision of subsection
(f)(2) serves to narrow the scope of subsection (f)(1).82 Applying a
strict textual interpretation to the facts in Promega seems to prove
this view correct, provided that we assume that the accused kit
requires all five components to function.83 If LifeTech were
shipping just the buffer solution—a common commodity—
overseas, finding patent infringement based on the buffer would not
seem like a correct result.
These criticisms of the Promega decision highlight the
ambiguity of the court's interpretation of subsection (f)(1).
However, both § 271(c) and subsection (f)(2) as well as the statute's
legislative history strongly suggest that—although not stated
explicitly—subsection (f)(1) is concerned with the infringement of
material components of an invention, or components that are
especially adapted to the invention, regardless of their commodity
status. Because of this ambiguity in both the statute and case law,
the task of threading the needle between these poles of the indirect
infringement continuum is extremely difficult.
Members of the patent bar community have proposed
various fixes to Deepsouth's clarity problem.84 This Article focuses
2014).
80
Rantanen, supra note 7.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Tautz Patent, supra note 2. (The five components were: a) a mixture of
primers; b) a polymerase; c) the G, C, T, and A nucleotides; d) a buffer solution;
and e) template DNA).
84
See, e.g., Neil M. Zipkin, Infringement and Assembly Abroad—Patent
Protection Takes a Vacation in Deepsouth, 47 St. JOHN'S L. REV. 662, 663–64,
691 (1973) (proposing a statute to overcome Deepsouth, "Whoever shall
substantially manufacture in the United States so much of the unpatented
elements of a patented combination that the patentable aspect of that
combination is captured, and there exists no significant practical use for such
manufactured items, other than assembly into the patented combination, and
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on answering the question of what constitutes a "substantial portion
of the components" by reading the word "substantial"—which
means "quantity" according to its plain definition—to mean
"material," which addresses the substance of the invention.85 Under
this theory, the components must be especially adapted for use, but
the §271(c) and subsection (f)(2) requirements regarding
commodity status of the components would be removed.86 In effect,
I would interpret section (1) as follows:
Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied
in or from the United States all or a substantial material
portion of the components especially adapted for use in of a
patented invention, where such components are uncombined
in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the
combination of such components outside of the United
States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such
combination occurred within the United States, shall be
liable as an infringer.
The word "material" has support in early bills first proposed
to fix the Deepsouth problem which read, "[w]hoever without
authority supplies . . . the material components of a patented
invention."87 Applying the facts of the Promega case to each of
such assembly, requiring only minor integration, does in fact take place abroad,
shall be liable as a direct infringer.");.");."); Charles M. Kerr, Operable Versus
Substantial Assembly of Patented Combinations: A Critique of Deepsouth v.
Laitram, 26 STAN. L. REV. 893, 917–19 (proposing "Whoever, for export and
without authority, knowingly makes and/or sells, within the United States and
for use in a foreign country, but for minor final assembly and/or minor parts, any
patented combination during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.")..").."). See supra Part I for a discussion of the Deepsouth case.
85
substantial, adj., relating to size, quantity, solidity, etc. OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://www.oed.com.du.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry
/193050?redirectedFrom=substantial& (accessed March 12, 2016); material,
adj., of or relating to matter or substance. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
ONLINE,
http://www.oed.com.du.idm.oclc.org/view/Entry/114923?rskey=v5dKH8&result
=1&isAdvanced=false (accessed March 12, 2016).
86
35 U.S.C. §§ 271(c), (f)(2) (2015).
87
See, e.g., infra note 113 (emphasis added).
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these sections puts this rule to the test. Recall that the accused kits
contained five components, only one of which LifeTech
manufactured in the U.S. and shipped to the U.K. for assembly and
distribution worldwide.88 If LifeTech had shipped other components
overseas, would the result change? The following sections address
the components of the accused kits in decreasing order of what
would seem to be their special adaptation for use in the kit at issue
in Promega.
1. The Mixture of Primers
Supposing the primers were made in the U.S. and then
shipped overseas, what would result if they were evaluated for §
271(f)(1) compliance at different points along the indirect
infringement continuum? Putting aside the question of self–
inducement, and assuming there is an underlying act of predicate
infringement in the U.S. under § 271(a), § 271(b) could be sufficient
to capture the sale of the primers to a party who then infringes the
Tautz patent provided that Promega could show intent and
knowledge of the patent as required by the holding in SEB.89 If those
elements are missing or Promega cannot prove them, § 271(b)
cannot stop LifeTech. Since the primers are leaving the U.S. and not
being imported as a component, we can ignore § 271(c). While §
271(f)(2) would initially seem to protect Promega because the
primers are not a commodity and are especially adapted for use,90
the provision has the same problem as § 271(b) with regard to the
requirement of "intent and knowledge".
By contrast, the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) would require
only that we determine whether the primers are material to the
invention and were specially adapted for use in the kit. Based on the
88

Tautz Patent, supra note 21 (showing the five components: a) a mixture of
primers; b) a polymerase; c) the G, C, T, and A nucleotides; d) a buffer solution;
and e) template DNA)).)
89
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 764 (2011).
90
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (commenting on the laborious process for determining the proper set of
primers that will multiplex the targeted set of STRs).
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labor-intensive trial-and-error process which must be followed to
determine which set of primers will multiplex the targeted set of
STRs91, the primers are demonstrably an essential component of the
invention.92 It will not work without them. The mixture of primers
gets to the very heart of the claimed invention. Furthermore, the
primers were especially adapted for use in the invention and mark
the beginning and ends of the STRs, whose successful combination
is a laborious trial-and-error effort.93 Thus, the proposed § 271(f)(1)
reading would offer protection to Promega.
2. The Polymerase
Both the § 271(b) and the § 271(f)(2) analyses of the
invention's polymerase component proceed in much the same way
as for the primer mixture, and both have the same weakness of
requiring predicate direct infringement in the U.S. to satisfy both
"knowledge" and "intent" to infringe. I will not belabor analyses
under these sections further.
The proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) requires that we ask
whether polymerase is material to the invention. The polymerase is
material because the invention does not work without it; the DNA
cannot be amplified without polymerase, a fact admitted by
LifeTech's own witness at trial.94 The analysis becomes more
complicated with polymerase, in considering whether it is a
commodity item or whether it has been especially made or adapted
for the invention. It is possible to take a commodity item and adapt
it for a special use in a patent. This analysis has been summarized
below.

91

Id.
See supra Part II.
93
See id.
94
Promega, 773 F.3d at 1356.
92
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Table 2. Inducement liability for polymerase under § 271(f)(1) (proposed)
and § 271(f)(2).
For a material
component:
Commodity

Not a
Commodity

Especially made/adapted
Liability attaches under 271(f)(1)
(proposed)
Liability for inducement attaches
under 271(f)(2), if Promega proves
knowledge of the patent. If it
cannot prove knowledge, liability
attaches under 271(f)(1) (proposed)

Not especially
made/adapted
No liability for
inducement under
271(f)(1)
(proposed) or
271(f)(2).

If polymerase is a commodity that has not been especially
made for the invention, then liability will not attach under either §
271(f)(1) or § 271(f)(2), because the commodity has substantial noninfringing uses and has not been especially adapted. If polymerase
is not a commodity, but has been especially made or adapted, then
liability under § 271(f)(2) will attach, provided that Promega can
prove scienter. If Promega cannot prove scienter, liability could
attach under the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1). The key difference
between the two is the question of scienter: whether LifeTech knew
of the Tautz patent and its infringing acts. The test would thus satisfy
the interests of the policy underlying patent law. If polymerase is a
commodity that is adapted for the kits claimed in the Tautz patent,
the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) would protect Promega from
LifeTech's activities altogether.
3. The G, C, T, A Nucleotides95
Based on the same reasoning as the analyses above, these
molecules are material to the invention because the kit would not
95

Note that these nucleotides alone, being molecules found in nature, are not
patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as affirmed by the
Supreme Court in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) ("The Court has long held that this provision
contains an important implicit exception. . . . ': [L]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas' are not patentable...").
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work without them.96 In order to replicate DNA, it is necessary to
have the underlying nucleotide building blocks available97.
However, this component would fail the especially adapted prong
of the proposed § 271(f)(1) test because nucleotides are present in
every living organism known to science and were not especially
adapted for the kit. They also fall under the purview of § 271(f)(2)
as having substantial non-infringing uses. This result aligns with
common sense: shipping common components overseas for
combination in an infringing product should not be seen as
inducement to infringe.
4. The Buffer Solution
As with previous components, the buffer solution is likely to
be material because the kit cannot work without it; it is one of the
claimed components of the invention.98 If the buffer solution were
not especially adapted for the accused kit, the proposed
interpretation of § 271(f)(1) would allow manufacture of the buffer
in the U.S. for shipment overseas. Further, the solution falls under
the commodity or staple exception in § 271(f)(2). In the case of the
nucleotides, inducement liability could attach only where the buffer
had been especially adapted.
5. The Template DNA
For purposes of the template DNA are certainly material to the
kit.99 Under the proposed interpretation of § 271(f)(1), the question
becomes whether the template DNA was especially adapted for the
kit. Thus, if Promega "especially adapted" the template DNA for use
in the kit, export for foreign combination would expose LifeTech to
liability under the proposed reading of § 271(f)(1) even without the
knowledge of infringement required under § 271(f)(2). Once again,
this approach yields a fair result.

96

J.D. Watson & F.H.C. Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids, 171
NATURE 737, 737 (1953).
97
Id.
98
Tautz Patent col. 16, l. 43–61, supra note 23.
99
See supra Part II.
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6. Summary
In each of the five analyses above, the proposed
interpretation of § 271(f)(1) would not only fall in line with common
sense, but would be consistent with the U.S. Constitution's aim "[t]o
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
. . . Discoveries."100 This interpretation would also protect a patent
holder from having the key pieces of its inventions shipped overseas
for infringing purposes— the exact situation Congress was trying to
avoid when it enacted 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) to close the Deepsouth
loophole.101 Further, it could provide added protection to patent
holders who cannot prove scienter on the part of the accused
infringer, which is in line with Congress's intent in enacting §
271(f).102
Such an interpretation would also avoid the question raised
in Promega as to whether one component can be a "substantial" part
of the invention. The quantity of the components should be
irrelevant; rather, the materiality of the components is key. Suppose,
for instance, that the preferred embodiment of an invention was
comprised of a hundred parts, and an accused infringer exported
ninety-nine non-material parts overseas for combination with the
last part. Further suppose that the invention would not work without
the last part. Under certain readings of § 271(f)(1), this would look
like a substantial portion of the components and should allow
liability to attach. Moreover, it seems absurd to hold someone liable
as an infringer through the extraterritorial imposition of U.S. law if
such parts are not required to make the accused device work.
However, the proposed interpretation of § 271(f)(1), would not
attach liability under such conditions. As such, the patent holder
would be left with recourse to § 271(a), should the infringer import
100

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
2014) ("Congress . . . sought to 'prevent copiers from avoiding United States
patents by supplying components of a patented product in this Country so that
the assembly of the components may be completed abroad.'" (citing Legislative
History, supra note 49, at 5828)).
102
See infra Part IV.D.
101
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the accused device into the U.S., sensibly limiting the
extraterritoriality of U.S. patent law.
Now suppose that one material part of the previous invention
was made in the U.S. for combination with the other ninety-nine
overseas. LifeTech's reading of § 271(f)(1) as introduced in
Promega would not count such an action as infringement. By
contrast, the proposed interpretation of § 271(f)(1) would catch this
activity as infringement by attaching liability to the action of
shipping a material piece of another's patent overseas for assembly
to skirt U.S. patent law. Further, because § 271(f)(1) does not require
knowledge of the patent, the proposed interpretation puts a useful
tool into the hands of U.S. patent holders. As such, this would be an
appropriate exercise of the extraterritoriality of U.S. law.
C. Self-Inducement: Is it Infringement?
One of the controversial holdings of the Promega case was
that a party may be liable under 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) for supplying
a component even to onetself for combination outside the U.S.103 In
other words, one could induce oneself to infringe a patent. The
patent blogosphere criticized this decision;104 Rantanen in particular
attacked the majority's textual analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) as
"deeply flawed."105 Both Rantanen and Promega's majority rely on
dictionaries to examine the meaning of 'induce' under the
provision.106 However, this view misses the larger points of the
policy that Congress wished to effectuate when it enacted § 271(f)—
namely, to close the loophole left by the Supreme Court's Deepsouth
decision. Overturning Promega would have brought about a return
of Deepsouth, where infringers would need only set up "finishing
plants" abroad to receive the components of a device that, once
assembled, would infringe a U.S. patent.107
103

Promega, 773 F.3d at 1353.
See, e.g., Rantanen, supra note 7.
105
Id.
106
Id.; see also Promega, 773 F.3d at 1351.
107
Houston Patent Law Association, Comments and Recommended Changes
Senate Bill 2504: "The Patent Reform and Modernization Act of 1973" 6 (1973)
[hereinafter Houston Report]. Not sure about this one, check rule 13.
104
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Rantanen rebuffed the Federal Circuit's argument that
Congress could have added the word "another" to the statute if it had
intended to restrict inducement to third parties108 by claiming that
"[t]ypically, the principle is invoked in the context of a parallel
statute."109 However, this view misses both the rich legislative
history of § 271(f) and the continuum of indirect infringement that
Congress has laid down over the years, with contributory
infringement at one end—represented by § 271(c) and (f)(2)—
inducement at the other end with § 271(b), and § 271(f)(1) in the
middle to apply to inducement to combine a substantial portion of
the components of an infringing device.110
Rantanen further noted the Supreme Court has required
inducement of another in patent and copyright cases
respectively.111However, Promega stands firmly within both the law
as written and the intent of the Congress that drafted it.112 The
Federal Circuit analyzed the plain meaning of the term "induce,"
construing it to mean "to bring about, or to cause."113 No version of
the bill, the court noted, suggests that Congress intended to require
the presence of a third party by adding the word "another" to the
statute.114 In reviewing the legislative history, the court also found
that Congress had focused on closing the loophole left by the
Supreme Court's unpopular Deepsouth decision, not on a question
of whether inducement is a three-party affair.115
Any future decision which attempts to overturn the Federal
Circuit's Promega decision would open a gaping loophole in the
108

Rantanen, supra note 7.
Id.
110
See supra Part IV.B.
111
See id.
112
See infra Part IV D.
113
Promega Corp. v. Life Technologies Corp., 773 F.3d 1338, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2014)
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1352 ("Congress . . . sought to 'prevent copiers from avoiding United
States patents by supplying components of a patented product in this Country so
that the assembly of the components may be completed abroad.'" (citing
Legislative History, supra note 49, at 5828)).
109
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extraterritorial reach of U.S. patent law. It would allow domestic
companies to escape infringement liability under § 271(f)(1) by
shipping infringing components to themselves, rather than to a thirdparty. Because direct infringement does not apply abroad, §
271(f)(1) determines instead that "[w]hoever . . . supplies . . .
components . . . in such a manner as to actively induce the
combination of such components outside of the United States in a
manner that would infringe the patent if such a combination
occurred within the United States, shall be liable."116 Would
Congress have intended to treat more harshly a domestic company
that shipped components abroad to a foreign company than a
domestic company that shipped the components to itself overseas?
Finding that inducement of the combination of infringing
components, rather than focusing on the actor doing the inducement,
would prevent such a result.
D. Knowledge of Infringement Versus Knowledge of Acts
1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) does not require knowledge of the patent.
When considering infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271, it is
important to address the accused infringer's intententions, level of
knowledge, and actions. For example, § 271(b), (c), and (f)(2)117 all
require some knowledge of indirect infringement, either explicitly,
or via Supreme Court precedent.118 Whether an alleged infringer
knew they were infringing a patent, or whether they merely had
knowledge of the acts that form the basis for the infringement is
often critical. Whether the same can be said for section f(1) has yet
to be addressed in any court.
The text of 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) suggests that an individual
needs only to supply components that, when combined outside the
country, would infringe upon a patent in order for infringement
liability to attach.119 However, "[i]ntent and knowledge" of a patent
are not explicit requirements under § 271(f)(1), nor has the case law
116

35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2015).
35 U.S.C. §§ 271 (b), (c), (f)(1)-(2).
118
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
119
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2015).
117
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read them into the statute as it has for § 271(b).120 Under § 271(f)(1),
it is the act of supplying the components, their combination, or
hypothetical combination, to infringe a patent that attaches liability;
knowledge of the patent is not required.121
As an example, suppose that LifeTech had merely developed
an infringing product in parallel to Promega with no knowledge of
the Tautz patent. If, under this scenario, LifeTech sold this device in
the U.S., its sales would be direct infringement under § 271(a).122
Under the same scenario, however, if LifeTech shipped the
components to outside the U.S. for assembly, liability would attach
under § 271(f)(1), even without evidence of knowledge of the
patent. On the other hand, if LifeTech knew of the Tautz patent and
subsequently shipped its components abroad for combination,
liability would attach under § 271(f)(2), provided Promega could
prove LifeTech's knowledge of the patent.
Requiring knowledge of the act which created infringement,
but not of the fact of infringement itself, addresses concerns raised
by critics. In his amicus brief in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB
S.A., Ted Sichelman—Director of the Center for Intellectual
Property Law & Markets, and Professor of Law at the University of
San Diego—argued that presumably one would only need bury one's
head in the sand and avoid looking for patents, and remain blissfully
ignorant to the possible infringement landscape around him in order
to avoid liability under § 271(f)(1).123 Ignorance of the law would
become the ultimate defense as would-be infringers strategically
avoided looking at patents as part of their clearance-to-practice
activities. Provided the maker of an infringing widget knew he was
making the widget,, whether he was aware of any patents infringed
upon should be irrelevant.
2. Congress Did Not Intend§ 271(f)(1) to Require Knowledge of
120

See Global-Tech Appliances, 563 U.S. at 764.
35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1).
122
35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
123
Brief for Sichelman, et. al., as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, GlobalTech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754 (2011) (No. 2010-06)),) at 33
[hereinafter Sichelman Brief].
121
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the Patent or Intent.
Reading intent into § 271(f)(1) does not comport with the
legislative history of the statute. In fact, the history shows that
Congress considered, and removed, the intent and knowledge
requirements from early versions of § 271(f), splitting the proposed
sections into § 271(f)(1)—which has no knowledge and intent
requirements—and § 271(f)(2), which had both.124 Without a
requirement for knowledge of the infringing act, the bright-line
difference between subsections (f)(1) and (f)(2) becomes intent.
Is it logical to question that Congress intended § 271(f)(1) to
require only knowledge of acts, not knowledge of infringement, for
liability to attach? While such an interpretation would seem to fly in
the face of the Supreme Court's decision in SEB regarding 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b),125 the statute's legislative history supports the theory that
knowledge of acts should be sufficient for liability. An early version
of § 271(f) appears in a 1983 Senate bill; this version included an
intent element and elided the "actively induce" element, but
otherwise paralleled the current language of § 271(f)(1).126 The
presence of intent in S. 1535, absent from the version of § 271(f)(1)
that became law, indicates Congress considered intent in subsection
(f)(1) before removing it. Moreover, bills seeking to fix the
Deepsouth ruling appeared in various forms in the 98th Congress,
all containing both elements of knowledge and intent.127
In June 1984, the American Intellectual Property Law
Association ("AIPLA") advised Congress to remove the knowledge

124

See also supra Part IV.B.
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011)
(holding that induced infringement requires knowledge of the patent in suit).
126
S. 1535, 98th Cong. § 1 (1983) ("Whoever without authority supplies or
causes to be supplied in the United States the material components of a patented
invention, where such components are uncombined in whole or in part,
intending that such components will be combined outside of the United States,
and knowing that if such components were combined within the United States
the combination would be an infringement of the patent, shall be liable as an
infringer.") (emphasis added); see, e.g., H.R. 4526, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R.
4814, 98th Cong. (1984).
127
S. 1535, 98th Cong. § 1 (1983).
125
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requirement from the pending House bill.128 The AIPLA's argument
centered on a potential plaintiff's difficulty in proving both
infringement and a "knowing" state of mind on the part of the
defendant.129 The AIPLA thought that requiring knowledge would
allow an accused infringer an "easy escape" from liability and would
essentially gut the provision.130 This recommendation was
eventually codified as 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1), without elements for
knowledge or intent.131
The AIPLA was rightly concerned that a knowledge of
infringement requirement would lead to an "easy escape" for
infringers.132 Its report to Congress noted that "[t]he holding in the
Deepsouth Case enables domestic copiers to circumvent the
protection afforded by the patent laws by taking simple evasive

128

AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT TO THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY (Jun. 13, 1984).("We recommend that
the word "knowing" be deleted from line 5 on page 2 [of H.R. 4526, 98th Cong.
(1983)]. Section § 271(f) like existing Section 271(a) defines activities which
constitute direct infringement of a patent. If a patentee brings suit pursuant to
Section 271(a), he must prove that the alleged infringer committed the infringing
acts. A judge or jury decides whether or not the patent was infringed. Section §
271(f) as drafted would require that the patentee not only prove that the alleged
infringer committed the infringing acts and intended the combining of the
material components outside of the U.S. but also that he did so 'knowing" that
components when combined would "be an infringement of the patent." The
existence of this state of mind in the alleged infringer would be extremely
difficult to prove. Proof of infringement involves both facts and law and cannot
be known until after a court determination. Therefore, for the patentee to prove
that the alleged infringer "knew" would be an easy escape for the unscrupulous
infringer and would effectively nullify the section. But more importantly, the
reason § 271(f) should be added to the law is that patent rights should be
protected whether an infringer finally assembles the infringing product in the U.
S. or arranges to have it done in a foreign country. We see no reason to require a
higher burden of proof in one set of circumstances and not the other.")
[hereinafter AIPLA Report].
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
AIPLA Report, supra note 134.
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production and marketing tactics."133 Similarly, the Houston Patent
Law Association warned of just such an effect of the Deepsouth case
in 1973, writing, "[u]nder the Deepsouth holding, American
industry is encouraged to construct 'finishing plants' overseas, . . .
[t]his situation would allow an infringer to set up shop next door to
a patent-protected inventor whose product enjoys a substantial
foreign market and deprive him of valuable business."134 Is the
construction of such a finishing plant anything but self-inducement?
The Houston Report also made the argument that it is contrary to
notions of efficiency and cost to force a patent holder to defend itself
against an infringer in numerous foreign jurisdictions, rather than
just the single infringing company in the U.S. inducing itself.135
Further, Senator Strom Thurmond noted that the purpose of
the early bills addressing Deepsouth was "[t]o declare it to be patent
infringement to supply components of an invention patented in the
United States for final assembly abroad if the purpose of the
shipment abroad is to circumvent a U.S. patent."136 Nothing in the
statute's legislative history suggests that the purpose of the proposed
legislation was only to apply to inducement of others.137 The plain
language "to circumvent a U.S. patent" applies to the situation of
direct infringement.138 Congressional records make it clear that
Congress wrote § 271(f) to overcome Deepsouth139—specifically
the Supreme Court's determination that "[w]e cannot endorse the
view that the 'substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of (a)
machine' constitutes direct infringement."140 If § 271(f) was
designed to overcome Deepsouth, it follows that it was Congress's
intention that the new statute would construe the manufacture of the
constituent parts as direct infringement. In its report on 98 S. 1535—
a predecessor to the bill that would become 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)—the
reviewing Senate committee stated that "[t]he bill simply amends
133

Id.; H.R. 6286, 98th Cong. (1984).
Houston Report, supra note 107.
135
Id.
136
S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 1 (1984).
137
Id.
138
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
139
98 Cong. Rec. H28069 (daily ed. October 1, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kastenmeier); see also S. Rep. No. 98-663, at 2–3 (1984).
140
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 528 (1972).
134
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the patent law so that when components are supplied for assembly
abroad to circumvent a patent, the situation will be treated the same
as when the invention is "made" or "sold" in the United
States."141Making, selling, or using a patented invention in the U.S.
is direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. 271(a).142 This strongly
suggests that Congress never wanted to exclude self-inducement
under § 271(f)(1).
Upholding the Promega decision would largely eliminate
the practice of opinion counsel, which has historically been selfserving. If a finding of infringement requires knowledge, alleged
infringers could skirt the law simply by procuring an attorney's letter
to show that they had a reasonable belief that their devices did not
infringe.143 While the Supreme Court has eliminated the use of
opinion counsel with regard to invalidity of patents, it has not
addressed opinion counsel with respect to patent infringement.144
Once the requirement for knowledge of infringement is removed,
however, the loophole from infringement liability closes.
Most practically, overturning the Federal Circuit in Promega
would effectively invite such evasive production tactics as discussed
in the AIPLA Report.145 Any company could simply set up an
assembly subsidiary in another country in order to infringe to its
heart's content, much to the detriment of American ingenuity and
the patent provision of the U.S. Constitution.146 By gutting the law
that was meant to overturn such tactics, Deepsouth would rise again.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit correctly concluded in Promega that one
can induce oneself to infringe a patent, and that a single component
can constitute a "substantial portion of the components" under 35
U.S.C. § 271(f)(1). Presuming a continuum of indirect infringement
141

Sichelman Brief, supra note 128, at 34.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1929 (2015).
145
AIPLA Report, supra note 134.
146
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
142
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ranging from 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) to 271(c) and (f)(2), this Article
has proposed a new interpretation of § 271(f)(1) to find indirect
infringement when a material portion of components of a patented
device are shipped overseas for combination. This would focus
attention on the importance of the components to the function of a
device, rather than the quantity. The proposed interpretation also
would require that the components be especially adapted for use in
the patented device. Lastly, this Article argued that § 271(f)(1)
requires only knowledge of the acts ultimately constituting
infringement, rather than knowledge of the patent those acts
infringe. Should the Supreme Court affirm the Federal Circuit's
holding, it will keep Deepsouth from rising again.
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Where possible, showing that an accused infringer
knew of or intended to infringe a patent, should be
the preferred course of action. This could allow a
plaintiff to recover enhanced damages.152
Direct patent infringement in the U.S. is essentially
a strict liability offense under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
An accused infringer operating in a complete
vacuum, unaware of a patent, can still infringe it.
Under the current law, it is inducement to infringe a
patent to ship a substantial portion of the
components of a patented device overseas for
combination, if that combination would constitute
infringement in the U.S.

35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); see also Halo Elecs., Inc. v. Pulse Eleccs., Inc., 136
S. Ct. 1923 (2016).

